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2Abstract
Abstract
Build ing on the predecessors' thoughts and modern researches from empirica l
disciplines, and with thinking over the behavior assumption usua lly held and used by
mainstream economics, the paper genera lizes three basic assumptions and one
explanatory framework on human individual behavior and its process, and stresses
hierarchica l character ist ics in preferences, heterogeneity between learning capacity
and learning and, human dealing with and reducing uncertainty from environments in
the process of natural evolution, and rethinks the quest ions of individual rationa lity,
acquirement of behavior mode, intellectual history on "knowledge" in the level of
exper ientialism. The purpose is that along the path of "falsifying a theory" and with
the help of empirica l results, the paper trys to propose behaviora l presuppositions and
thinking framework, so that enhancing the effectiveness of economic theory on
expla ining individual behavior in real situations, and in the end advancing
transdisciplinary researches between the empirica l and socia l sciences.
Keywords
Keywords
: assumption, explanatory framework, individual behavior, hierarchica l
preference, learning capacity, knowledge, evolutionary process, empirica l substrate,
transdiscipline
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1.
Introduction
Introduction
Economicists have been continuously qust ioning basica lly economic assumption on
individual behaviorheld by main stream economics - the rationa l assumption (for
instance, Alla is, 1953; Smith, 2003; North, 2005; etc.). Debates among economic
methodologies based on respective behaviora l assumptions, which even lasted
longer(Boland, 2005).
In fact, one implicit problem in debates is: what so ever does economics need basic
assumptions in order to properly expla in or anylize human individual behavior? For
those assumptions and their uses, need or not, can or not, in the basis of empirica lly
testable results but not in some prior or axiomatic postulate, be it given, even if there is
not perfectly mathmatic formaliza tion at first?
If there is certain ambiguity in explor ing human individual ma inly from viewpoints
of philosophy or psychology(Vanderwolf, 2007), then nowadays, many empirica l
disciplines, for instances, brain science, neuroscience, modern anthropology and
anima l behavior study so forth, which are developing rapid ly, have been accumula ting
a large number of fruits on human behavior and, have thought it from the
transdisciplina ry viewpoints(e.g., Wilson, 1998; Fellows, 2004; Bloom, 2006; Gintis,
2007).
4Following the thought on " falsifying a theory "(Popper, 1963), the paper insists that
to economics, it is necessary and feasible that basing on testable materia ls from
empirica l disciplines , we put forward individual behavior assumptions and expla in
behaviora l process. And by this way, we also can avoid theoret ica l randomicity or
arbitrariness possibly from superficia l induction or logica lly abstact deduction.
This method is possibly denounced as "reductionism" in socia l sciences . But it will
be worth if doing this way can make us achieving more facts and comprehension on
them (Crick ,1994).
Through genera lizing predecessors' thoughts and marsha lling empirica l find ings, in
the paper, we summarize three assumptions on human individual behavior , and
propose a basic ly reduced framework on thinking individual behavior process. The
aim is that starting from testable materia ls we try to understand and expla in human
individual behavior in real situation.
The paper will be arranged as follow: based on empirica l materia ls, three basic
assumptions on individual behavior are offered separately from the second to the
fourth part; based on the assumptions , one reduced framework on individual behavior
process is given in the fifth part; fina lly in the sixth, related quest ions are discussed
and the paper is concluded.
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In the process of natural select ion dealing with uncertain environments, biological
organisms, including human individual, form stable behaviora l tropisms or
propensities internalized in their genes (Lorenz, 1981; Morris, 1970; Wilson, 2000;
etc.). In a study on behaviora l science, Vanderwolf (2007) thought genera lly those
innate tendencies come from activity of micro-particles within organismic cells.
To human behaviora l tendenc ies to "trend ing" or "avoid ing", ma instream economics
ususa lly genera lize all of them into a conception "preference ", to which, however, its
scope is not narrow within innate ones but more wide, for instance, including
individual interests or aims(e.g.,Becker, 1976).
From viewpoints of modern neurobiology (Nicholls , et al., 2001; Jirsa and McIntosh,
2007; ect), innately behaviora l propensity of an individual can be considered as a
stable contact from one neuron to another, which is character ized by the neuronal
synapse. By contrast, in human economic-socia l activities, these behaviora l tendencies
(or interests), var ied with persons or space-time , are not so. They are acquired by
trying or imitating in individual exper iences in uncertain environments. Therefore,
when describing individual tendenties (or preferences) in economics, it is necessary to
deal with them hierarchica lly: at last two hierarchies - the inner ly stable preferences
(or propensities) and the outer ly mutable ones. Therefore, we may have:
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That means: while some of individual preferences vary with outside conditions, there
exist unalterable ones . Comparatively, preferences can hierarchica lly be divided into
the inner ly stable and the outer ly mutable ones.
Formed in the process of natural evolution, the inner ly unalterable preferences
mainly involve those of energy ingest ion, sex, explor ing or novelty-seeking, ect1. The
first two have been deeply studied by sociobiology and other behavior sciences. The
paper mainly discusses innate and unalterable feature s of the last .
Morris(1970 , p.114) concluded that all mammal owns “neophilia ”, the propensity of
liking novelty; it is most prominent in human, and with increasing of years it is
enhanced in adulthood, and ultimately it becomes the foundation of human innovating.
From the basic biology, there exist some links between genes and the risk ing
behaviora l propensity in the sense of innovation(or novelty seeking). Hamer and
Copeland (1998) attributed the propensity to dopamine, and thinks its quantity perhaps
mainly depends on the D4DR gene positioned in No.11 chromosome2.
1 Ohter types which can be viewed as inner preferences, such as obedience (Milgram, 1963), ritualized behavior
(Boyer, et al., 2006, a, b), and so forth, have been researched in empirical disciplines, too.
2 Benjamin et al.(1996) and Ebstein et al.(1996) thought D4DR is only a part and not all. Herbst et al.(2000)
thought the assoviation is not significant between some kinds of novelty seeking and polymorphic D4DR.
7In comparison between populations, by estimating samples from different nations in
different areas, Ono et al.(1997) concluded that to the relation between polymorphic
D4DR and novelty seeking propensity, the relevancy is independent of nationa l
differentiae. In their sampling statist ics of genet ic-epidemiology, Eisen et al.(2001)
showed that the essentia l reason about pathological gambling (PG), the preference of
morbid ly seeking stimuli from gambling, exist in genet ic factors, and the patients have
a genetic defect singly correspond ing to the sickness; in the aspect of nervous
mechanism, the morbid behavior is rooted in neurotransmitters determined by genes ,
such as dopamine.
Therefore, to human species, we may believe that the inner preferences are stable and
same between everyone (if neglect ing the difference on food-taking among Inuit lived
in the Arctic regions and other humans).
Compared to the above, largely exsiting behaviora l preferences, which alteded with
individuals or space-time (e.g., Salganik, 2006), are the outer ly mutable ones,
influenced by individual behavior learning.
Innerly stable preferences are the ultimate substrate forming outer ly mutable ones;
the reason why inner preferences are same and stable is that they are derived from the
essentia l requirements in biological existence of human species and coping with
uncertainty of circumstances ; based on them, the reason why the outer preferences
8have great differences is that individuals encounter different environmental signa ls in
respective exper iences , or endow signa ls with different weighting (value).
In addition, the paper believes preferences can be measured. The inner ones are
determined by measurable intensities of synaptic connect ions, and the outer ones can
ultimately be showed on the level of behaviora l performances.
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Built on the innerly stable preferences, the reason why an individual can perform a
learning behavior in facing with repeated or new signa ls outside is that from
behaviora l performance, connect ions caused by some conditions are rewarded and the
others are published. But the foundation of the learning behavior - capacity of forming
connect ions - is offered by biological substrate from an individual and not by acquired
learning. When discussing on human aggression, Wilson(2000, p.255) had indica ted,
"We are now sophist ica ted enough to know that the capacity to learn certain behaviors
is itself a genet ically controlled and therefore evolved tait."
Various behavior abilities showed by individuals are results from learning or training
in different situations postnatally, but the capacity which makes individual's learning
possible is unlearned one, not of the traits of Lamarckism in inher itance: it is identica l
in nature to humans. Empirica l disciplines have discovered some types of the capacity.
9Therefore, different from learning3, learning capacity means biologica lly unlearned
substrate which make individual learning possible in the beginning, and limit
consequent connect ions acquired from learning process. In this way, there is:
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Which means that learning capacity is a kind of unlearned one on which an individual
must depend to perform learning behavior. It is irrelative to acquired learning and to
cultures in different areas.
It involves key points as following.
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Learning is a process an individual forming and storing connect ions between signa ls ,
as which can be called acquired connect ions. The process also can be accomplished by
3 There are abundant empirical materials on learning in the fields of behavior study and other disciplines.
Summing up them, we consider that learning
learning
is an individual to establish connections between events(signals) and
form the storage about them, and then some of them will be able to be retrieved and primed. Therefore, learning
means a process in which connections can be formed and established; the storage of connections that have been
learned in this process can be called memory
memory
.
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means of mechanisms of reinforcement.
By exper iments, early behavior ism opened out the mechanism of rewards or
punishments about individual learning on the level of behaviora l
performance(e.g.,Thorndike, 1931). Bandura et al.(1963) and Bandura(1986)
expatiated on a learning behavior , modeling. Linked with the research from
Bingenheimer et al.(2005) , it is showed that through learning (enact ive or
observationa l), an individual can establish and store the relationa l connect ions between
signa ls (events) and, prime them under correspond ing situations. Frank et al.(2004)
expla ined neurobiologica l basis for human learning from exper iences.
u
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As indica ted above, learning capacity is a biological substrate on learning behavior . It
not only can make learning behaviors possible, but also limit the degree and domain
human individuals undertaking them.
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Combining empirica l results together, we perhaps can divide learning capacity into
following three types on signa ls (or signa l modes) outside the world within certain
degree and domain: capacity of recognizing, anticipatory operating, and dynamic
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switching between signa l connect ions.
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In chemica l signa ls recognizing, for instance, Hao et al.(2005) found that the neurons
of the anterior piriform cortex in the brain of mammal (including humans), possess a
basic capacity for recognizing a deficiency of indispensable amino acids (IAAs) for
protein synthesis , and then guiding and adjust ing food select ion for their survival.
In socio-signa ls recognizing, Rudebeck et al.(2006) showed that the prima te's brain
can appropriately recognize and respond to some important socia l information, such as
observing other attract ing individuals or others upper in socia l class.
3.2.2
3.2.2
C
C
apacit
apacit
y
y
of
of
A
A
nticipatory
nticipatory
O
O
perating
perating
Schultz et al.(1997) indica ted that a neural substrate of the capacity is dopaminergic
neurons in the prima te whose fluctuating output apparently signa ls changes or errors in
the predict ions of future salient and rewarding events, and suggested that it is the
fluctuating output that forms the prima te’s the capacity to predict future events, and
permits the creature to detect, model, and manipulate the causal structure of its
interact ions with its environment.
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Brown and Braver(2005) showed that some areas in human brain predict error
likelihood in a given context, even for trials in which there is no error or response
conflict.
Rougier et al.(2005) suggested in normally human brain, the specia lized neural
substrate and its fundamental capacity for producing abstract rule-like representations,
and guiding stimulus processing according to abstract dimensions that apply across
both familia r and task-novel stimuli.
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It is obvious that normal individuals' behavior can be adjusted to adapt to
environmental changes. Its substrate is that neural networks and neurons adapt to
environmental demands by switching between dist inct dynamica l behaviors.
Machens et al.(2005) showed the dynamica l properties of the frontal-lobe neurons
switching between stimuli happened in succession. Ridder inkhof and Wildenberg
(2005) also showed that regions, even single neurons, in the frontal brain can
implement cognitive control through dynamic adaptation of their firing patterns.
3.2.4
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Common function of learning capacity is to cope with and reduce uncertainties from
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the world outside, and to improve survival probability of an individual in
environments. Although far from perfect and sufficient, the capacity is great important
to human beings .
For instance, the capacity of recognising signa ls, especia lly extract ing modes, is a
foundation abstract ing rules about certain behavior category, which will allow an
individual to greatly reduce environmental complication, to enhance the brain's
memory to signa ls (events) and rapid ly accumula te individual knowledge; the capacity
of anticipatory estimation makes individuals in advance preparing for the relevant
signa ls, which is a basis forming mechanisms of anticipatory evaluation-feedback
(details in Assumption 3 following); together with the former two, the capacity of
dynamic switching between signa l connect ions makes possible the continuous
adjustment in individual behavior and cognition, and enhances individual flexibility
and adaptability.
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As far as its essentia lly unlearned property and function is concerned, learning
capacity is identical to each person.
Evolutiona ry psychology (e.g.,Cosmides and Tooby,1992) indica ted that in the long
evolutionary history, human beings have reliably and universa lly evolved a series of
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cognitive circuits to provide humans with neura l-physiologica l substrates of socia l
behaviors .
Hauser and Spelke (2004) called the basic capacity as the “core knowledge” systems,
a set of psychological and neural mechanisms, which evolved before humanity and
thus are shared with other anima ls, and emerge early in human development and thus
are common to everyone . They form the foundations for human acquired skills.
By a visiona l study, Hasson et al. (2004) indica ted a tendency of individual brains to
respond to the same scenes identica lly and collect ively during natural vision. The
character ist ics of activations in the brain showed the homogeneity that all human
brains work under the same natural signa l conditions, and can use signa ls from one
person’s brain to predict those in another’s when that person is in the same natural
conditions (Pessoa, 2004).
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The operating capacity pointed in Piaget(1972), and the logica l reasoning and
judgement usua lly talked over in socia l sciences , and so forth, all may be in certain
degree treated as the more subtle types of capacity subsequently produced after the
capacity of recognizing and anticipatory operating about signa ls (or signa l modes).
Lumsden and Wildson(1983) had pointed out that advanced reasoning is in the last
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period of human evolution. Cosmides and Tooby(1994) expla ined that rationa l
decision-making is very limited in human beings, by which human ancestors never can
resolve the reproducing and surviving problems repeatedly encountered themselves.
The plast icity of brain, i.e., the expanding capacity of human brain in some degree
(Stern and Hines, 2005; Sur and Rubenstein, 2005; Feldman and Brecht, 2005; ect.), is
also dist inct from the learning capacity in the paper, although it may give behaviora l
learning a hand. Through Gray and Thompson(2004) , Draganski et al.(2006) and
Tashiro et al.(2006) so forth, it is shown that the effects from the plast icity of human
brain is too limit.
4.
4.
Basic
Basic
Assumption
Assumption
3
3
:
:
Anticipatory
Anticipatory
E
E
valuation-feedback
valuation-feedback
M
M
echanism
echanism
From the assumption 1 and 2 above, when coping with the environments, an
individual can anticipatably estimate environmental signa ls, and compare them with
stable preferences distributed in respective hierarchies: if signa ls identical with the
orientation of preferences, “rewarded” evaluation will be formed and the same
directiona l connect ion s between the signa ls and the stable preferences can be stored in
the individual. On the contrary, the individual forms the reverse connect ions -
“published” evaluation, and stores a resulting state at the same time so as to prime
consequent behaviors. So there is assumption 3:
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It means a process and its resulting state in which, basing on hierarchica l preferences
and learning capacity, an individual anticipatably responds to and evaluates signa ls
from the outside.
Empirica l find ings demonstrate that there exist multi-types of the mechanism in
individuals. According to hierarchica l thinking in the paper, it possibly can be divided
into 3 types as following, those of which, based on the inner ly stable preferences ,
usua lly can not be consciously perceived by individuals; but the other, ma inly based
on outer ly alterable preferences, can be done ( for instance, economic anticipation
and evaluation in daily life).
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Reflex, well known in early behavior study (e.g., Pavlov,1927), can be regarded as
the type based on unlearned capacity and the innermostly stable preferences and,
respond ing to specific signa ls in almost fixed manner.
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Stabler types of the mechanism in inner hierarchy are built on learning capacity and
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inner ly stabler preferences.
There are abundant researches for the aspect recently, in which, for instances, on
neural networks in the brain involving immed iately available rewards and the delay
ones (McClure, et al. , 2004); anticipatory evaluation in the brain to some cognitive
information and relevant behavior regulating(Camille, et al. , 2004); the brain
dist inguishing, evaluating different decision-making information and guiding
behaviors in an iterated, two-person economic exchange(Tomlin, et al. , 2006); socia l
evaluation mechanism in the brain towards other individual’s actions and intentions
derived from the period of preverbal infants (Hamlin, et al. , 2007).
Additiona lly, emotion systems in the brain play an important role when coping with
risky and ambiguous choices(e.g., Hsu, et al. , 2005; etc.). Cosmides and Tooby (2006)
also believed that some of human mora lity or emotions are evolved from the process of
natural select ion, which work so naturally that their operation disappears unnoticed
into the background, or is taken for granted.
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Based on alterably acquired preferences , there exist large numbers of types of the
mechanism in outer hierarchy which mainly process signa ls from individual
exper iences , and they vary with stability of those preferences.
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Changes in individual's behavior , behavior modes and customs so on, discussed by
most economists and other scholars (e.g., North, 1981; Schotter, 1981; Masahiko Aoki,
2001; Ostrom, 2004; Camerer and Fehr, 2006.), which is behavior adjustments ma inly
processed by the mechanism.
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Synthesizing the three assumptions above, the paper trys to offer a reduced
framework on individual behavior, showed by Figure.1.
In the framework, inner preference and learning capacity const itute the stablest
hierarchy of individual behavior; basing on it, an individual anticipates and evaluates
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repeatedly environmental signa ls(events), and increasingly outside the hierarchy forms
multi-hierarchically, perceivably and alterably outer preferences with different
stability; thereby, facing with the signa ls(events), the individual shows repetitively and
observably behaviora l mode acting on environments(such as, behaviora l habits,
customs, etc.); after that, he or she anticipates or receives related ly feeding-back
signa ls, and through evaluat ing in inner and outer preferences, ma inta ins or adjusts
origina lly behaviora l mode(such as change of habits, customs). In this way, an
individual forms a dynamic behavior process on signa ls(events) outside: from stable
learning capacity and inner preference s to mutably outer preference s and, to
repetitively behaviora l mode in facing of signa ls.
The innerly stablest preferences will throughout engage in the process of evaluating
and feeding back signa ls, which unnecessarily can be perceived. So, in Figure.1, it is
denoted by an arrow with the broken line.
Additiona lly, evaluating results from the outer preferences can not be accumula ted in
the inner preference s and learning capacity, but just done in the outer. The reason is
that the stable inners and capacity are derived from the evolutionary process. Although
human behavior modes have vast ly been changed from the agricultural revolution to
now, from the viewpoints of natural evolution, the time is too short to select for new
complex cognitive programs (Cosmides and Tooby, 2006). Therefore, the paper treats
inner preference s and learning capacity as unalterable ones.
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The paper puts forward three assumptions and one framework on individual's
behavior and its process. Its aim is that basing on researches from empirica l disciplines,
we rethink basica lly behaviora l presupposition in economics and try to enhance the
effectiveness in behaviora l explanation from economic theory. According to empirica l
find ings, we believe the qust ions as following deserve to be thought and discussed in
economics and other sciences.
6.1
6.1
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Individual
Rationality
Rationality
Anew
Anew
Rationa lity is just weaker one of imperfect capacities owned by human individual.
Build ing on the assumption 1, we believe , three axiomatic character ist ics,
"completeness, transitivity, desirability" (e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1997, p.59),
which are used to describe the preference of consumer behavior from the rationa l
assumption usua lly held by mainstream economics, are only adaptive to the domain
involving inner preferences, not to others . Because empirica l evidences show that
compared to outer ly mutable preferences, just the inner ones have these more tangible
character ist ics. But on another hand, those evidences also provide empirica l
foundation for appropriately using mainstream economics.
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There is no difference in individual learning capacity. But through acquirement in
individual exper iences, some stabler behavior tendency can be accumula ted in outer
preferences, which forms relevant learning rule (seeing Figure.1) dist inct ively
influencing behavior mode, and brings about different people possessing different
performances or abilities. So, learning rule means behaviora l learning rule about how
establishing connect ions between signa ls (events) acquired from individual
exper iences. It is of hierarch ies with different stability. Therefore, individual
exper ience s have an important role between human biological substrate and realist ic
thought and psychology ( Stern and Hines , 2005).
The differences between these stabler learning rules in more inner hierarchies (such
as, some cognitive schemes or behaviora l habits from a persistent process of individual
socia lization), decide most differences between other learning rules (e.g.,Gordon,
2004); Also, learning rules different one another determine that under the similar
condition of exper iences, some people adjust their behaviors better, but others may do
not(e.g., Bloom and Weisberg, 2007).
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In early time, philosophers , such as the School of Sophists, Plato, Aristot le in ancient
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Greece, and Descartes, Hume, Kant so forth, continued to discuss the origin and
property of human knowledge. Hayek(1952) used more contemporarily empirica l
materia ls to expatiate on the problem of individual mind , in which some viewpoints
have been confirmed by modern empirica l disciplines (Steele, 2002).
Now, for the similar conjectures and quest ions in intellectual history above, we can
rely on new empirica l results and from the individual behavior point of view, give
them new thinking.
Generally, relatively stable behaviora l mode , viewed from behavior performance, is
the regular one, in which when facing with (certainly or uncertainly) environmental
signa ls, an individual knows how responding to them or knows how not doing(i.e.,
know how or know how not); viewed from the level of the brain's anatomy, it exhibits
stable respond ing states, in which the related brain areas are activated by some stimuli;
viewed from the level of neurology and molecular biology, it expresses that the stable
connect ions between neurons are shaped, and the stable channels are established in
which neurotransmitters are released and transmitted. Integrated the three levels
together, we believe , individual knowledge is the stable connect ions formed between
signa ls(or events); accumula tion of individual knowledge is the storage about the
stable connect ions; shared knowledge between individuals is the stably shared
anticipation between individuals on behaviora l responses from others facing with
signa ls. (The stably shared hierarch ies in preferences is crucia l to forming shared
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knowledge between individuals , which make possible communication between
different people. ). And, basing on the three assumptions above, we can realize that
there still exists hierarchica l character ist ic in individual knowledge and shared
knowledge, which respectively corresponds to the domains of inner ly stable or outer ly
mutable preferences; similarly, to the inner knowledge of individual or inner ly shared
knowledge between individuals, it usua lly can not yet be perceived consciously
(seeing the Figure. 1).
Economists had regreted to so little cooperation between economics and biology
(Tullock, 1987). Almost up till now, the quest ions on human individual behavior and
cognition are still "discussed completely independently in the faculties of
neurobiology and psychology, and on a different level in economics and linguist ics"
(Stern, et al., 2004, p.431). Correspond ingly, an inexplicable phenomenon maybe is:
many researchers from empirica l disciplines may pay attention to propositions usua lly
in philosophy or other socia l sciences; economists and other scholars in socia l science,
however, are short of "coordinate" interests to think over empirica l results carefully in
long time. In such a condition, facing with the rapid increase of results from empirica l
and trans-disciplines, how to treat and utilize those find ings properly to correct,
support or test their theor ies, which is one of important problems necessary to be
reflected on by economics, even all socia l scientists.
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